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Abstract. In this paper, I  present a  new argument against the compatibility 
of human free will and divine timelessness when conceiving of eternity in 
terms of an additional dimension as presented by brian leftow. The paper is 
organized as follows: After giving a brief sketch of leftow’s model, I argue that 
assuming libertarianism, free will presupposes presentism, since metaphysical 
indeterminism is only compatible with a presentist A-theory of physical time. 
Given this result, I make a case for the incompatibility of presentism and divine 
eternity modelled as a frame of reference, implying the incompatibility of the 
latter with human free will.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
The problem of reconciling human free will with divine foreknowledge 
has always been regarded as closely related to the question of defining 
God’s relation to time, since it has been acknowledged that it is at least 
non-trivial whether God’s knowledge of future events rules out genuinely 
free decisions concerning these events. Thereby, free will is generally 
understood in the libertarian sense, namely as the ability to do otherwise 
under the same circumstances.
The underlying problem can be set up, for example, this way:
(1) Necessarily, at all times, God believes alland only truths.
 (df. omniscience)
(2) God believes now that you will finish reading this paper tomorrow.
 (premise)
(3) Therefore you will finish reading this paper tomorrow.
 (from 1, 2)
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Prima facie, this result seems to imply that libertarian freedom and 
divine omniscience are mutually exclusive. Thus a proper solution to the 
freedom-foreknowledge problem has to explain why it is nevertheless 
not the case.
Traditionally, one tried to block the argument by stating that God is 
without temporal relations, this means, God lacks temporal extension 
and thus, divine eternity is to be conceived of as timelessness. Clearly, 
eternalism implies (~1) and (~2), since both (1) and (2) put God into 
a temporal relation. In consequence, in the framework of eternalism the 
above argument has to be modified as follows:
(1e) Necessarily, God believes all and only truths.
(2e) God believes that you will finish reading this paper tomorrow.
(3)   Therefore you will finish reading this paper tomorrow.
 (from 1e, 2e)
At first sight, there seems to be no real difference between the original 
argument and the modified one; they both lead to the same conclusion (3). 
However, so the traditional argument runs, in stating that God is timeless 
we cannot say that you will finish reading this paper tomorrow because 
God knew that you will finish reading this paper tomorrow before you 
decided to finish reading this paper tomorrow. Hence we cannot infer 
from the modified argument that God’s fore-knowledge caused your 
decision to finish reading this paper tomorrow and therefore, you 
were not free in your decision to finish reading this paper tomorrow, 
as being perfectly timeless God cannot fore-know anything. Yet we are 
neither justified in saying that from the modified argument it follows 
that you will freely finish reading this paper tomorrow, even though God 
eternally knows of it. The only thing we can infer from the argument is 
that it leaves the problem unsolved whether you will freely finish reading 
this paper tomorrow. Thus naturally the question arises if eternalism 
necessarily ends up with some sort of negative theology, or if it is simply 
an incomplete argument so that its implication for human free will is to 
be unfolded.
Currently, the starting point in tackling the freedom-foreknowledge 
issue has changed somewhat: it is libertarianism that is widely considered 
to be essential, or to put it another way, the very question has become 
if and to what extent divine foreknowledge of future events is possible 
given the ability to do otherwise under the same circumstances. In the 
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context of both process thought and open Theism a variety of options 
has been carefully worked out. The basic argument runs this way:
(1t) Necessarily, at all times, God believes all truths.
(2) God believes now that you will finish reading this paper tomorrow.
(3t) Therefore if you do not finish reading this paper tomorrow, you 
 render that God believes tomorrow that you did not finish reading 
 this paper on that day.1  (from 1t, 2)
Apparently, there is a price to pay when being committed to libertarian 
free will. Given freedom, divine foreknowledge needs a basic redefinition, 
or restriction in some sense, in so far as it is logically impossible even 
for an omniscient being to have knowledge about future contingents. 
Needless to mention that such positions have often been accused of 
not being able to give a  satisfying account of divine providence and 
eschatological hope. In considering these two lines while tackling the 
freedom-foreknowledge problem, the most natural question seems to be 
whether we could have it both ways, whether we can make the traditional 
view of divine timelessness securing foreknowledge and providence 
compatible with the modern libertarian view granting genuine freedom.
The most prominent contemporary approach to combining divine 
atemporality with libertarianism has been developed by oxford 
philosopher brian leftow.2 leftow claims that, when considering eternity 
as a  new, additional, and basically non-temporal dimension, divine 
atemporality becomes compatible with any theory of physical time, 
particularly with a presentist A-theory. This claim is remarkable, since 
for libertarianism presentism is commonly considered as a conditio sine 
qua non. To say it another way, if leftow’s model is sound, the eternalist 
can indeed have it both ways.
In this paper, I  question leftow’s claim. The paper is organized as 
follows: After giving a  brief sketch of leftow’s model, I  argue that 
assuming libertarianism, free will presupposes presentism, since 
metaphysical indeterminism is only compatible with a  presentist 
A-theory of physical time. Having shown this, it is straightforward to 
make a case for the incompatibility of indeterminism and divine eternity 
modelled as a  frame of reference, implying the incompatibility of the 
1 Note that it is possible to maintain (1) in its original form while considering future 
contingents to be false. In this case, (~2), but (3t) from (1).
2 Cf. leftow (1991b). Further aspects of his model are elaborated in leftow (1991a), 
leftow (1991c), leftow (2000), and leftow (2001).
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latter with human free will. Finally, I draw my own conclusions for the 
freedom-foreknowledge problem.
II. eTerNITY AS AN ADDITIoNAl FrAme oF reFereNCe
In his Time and Eternity, leftow offers an Anselmian model of the 
boethian resolution of the freedom-foreknowledge problem. unsur-
prisingly, he starts to develop his theory of divine timelessness with the 
very idea of boethius:
ST. God ‘sees’ all temporal events happen at once.
Assuming that God is omniscient, with (ST) we have to affirm:
ST1. All temporal events occur at once.
As otherwise God’s knowledge of events would differ from how they 
really occur. This, however, ‘sits ill with the claim that God is cognitively 
perfect’ (leftow 1991b: 218). on the other hand, in affirming (ST1), we 
seem to deny that events stand in earlier-later relations. Yet actual causal 
relations between events posit a  positive temporal distance that rules 
out temporal simultaneity of these events. Thus, to avoid the unwelcome 
consequence of (ST1) excluding causality between events, leftow argues 
for understanding simultaneity postulated by (ST1) in an atemporal 
sense. A natural candidate for such a concept is, of course, the notion 
of divine eternity. more exactly, strongly influenced by the concept of 
space-time in Special relativity, leftow suggests to conceive of eternity 
as ‘one more frame of reference, distinct from any temporal frame of 
reference’ (leftow 1991b: 234). Such an understanding makes it possible 
to affirm (ST1) without denying the existence of events occurring at 
different times, as in eternity all temporal events occur at once, while 
occurring at various points in time.3
To work out his proposal more precisely, leftow first gives a series of 
definitions (leftow 1991b: 238–41):
(6) ‘Now’ is a primitive term. (now)
3 leftow gives two main reasons why to assume the existence of such a  frame of 
reference, (1) an argument he calls Zero Thesis, and (2) the fact that if God exists, eternity 
is logically a date, namely the date of God’s existence. In this paper, I do not consider the 
Zero Thesis, in so far (as an additional motivation) it does not contribute to solving the 
underlying problem. Discussions of the Zero Thesis can be found in Padgett (2001) and 
Craig (2001).
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(7) An event e A-occurs iff e occurs now such that occurring now 
does not entail having a  position in a  b-series of earlier and 
later events. (A-occur)
(8) An event e b-occurs iff e’s location in a b-series is t, and it is 
now t. (b-occur)
Clearly, if event e b-occurs, e A-occurs, but not vice versa. For an event 
e A-occurs and does not b-occur, if e is not located in a b-series or if e 
A-occurs and is located in a b-series but does not A-occur at its b-series 
location. Yet this latter case can only be given, when a temporal event 
occurs in an atemporal frame of reference.
(9) Two events e1, e2 are b-simultaneous iff they have the same 
location in a  b-series in the same frame of reference r. 
 (b-simultaneity)
(10) Two events e1, e2 are A-simultaneous iff they are b-simultaneous 
and they b-occur. (A-simultaneity)
Given (6–10) it becomes possible to make a distinction between temporal 
and eternal frames of reference as well as temporal and eternal entities:
(11) r is an eternal frame of reference iff r is such that necessarily, 
all events that A-occur in r A-occur A-simultaneously-in-r. 
 (eternal frame of reference)
(12) r is a temporal frame of reference iff it is not the case that r 
is such that necessarily, all events that A-occur in r A-occur 
simultaneously. (temporal frame of reference)
(13) K is a  timeless entity iff K can A-occur but cannot b-occur. 
 (timeless entity)
(14) K is a temporal entity iff K can b-occur.  (temporal entity)
Accepting these definitions, we seem to have a  sound solution how 
a timeless God can be related to temporal events and entities. However, 
there is a price to pay for this solution:
[...] if one holds that God is timeless and omniscient, one has reason to 
say that the objects of God’s knowledge, including all temporal creatures, 
exist with Him in eternity. (leftow 1991b: 243)
For leftow this price doesn’t seem very high. Yet, as I shall show in the 
next section, this price is actually far too high. but let us first complete 
the reconstruction of leftow’s theory, by presenting his argument for the 
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compatibility of his model with presentism (and thus with libertarian 
free will).
According to leftow, when thinking of divine eternity as an additional, 
atemporal frame of reference, divine knowledge of future events does not 
rule out libertarian free will, in so far the model is compatible with both 
A-theories of time and b-theories of time, in particular with presentism:
[...] it can be true at a time t that an event dated at t+1 has not yet occurred 
in time, and yet also correct to say that that every event exists in eternity. 
That all events occur at once in eternity, I submit, does not entail that 
they all occur at once in time. (leftow 1991b: 232)
The argument for the compatibility of leftow’s eternity model with 
presentism rests upon the thesis of the relativity of simultaneity; it runs 
this way:
(15) Simultaneity and presentness are relative to frames of reference. 
 (premise)
(16) Present events are actual in some way in which future events 
are not. (presentism)
(17) Therefore the actuality of present events is relative to frames of 
reference.
Clearly, from (17) it follows that presentness simpliciter cannot be defined 
if there exist more than one temporal frame of reference. Contrarily, 
presentness can only be defined relative to a certain temporal frame of 
reference r. Consequently, leftow speaks of ‘nowr’ versus ‘nowr*’. In 
addition, he introduces a non-temporal relation P of causal priority:
P-series will be constituted of just those causal relations that are absolute 
and invariant within all temporal reference frames. (leftow 1991b: 232)
For any event Ẽ which is member of no P-series we can find a frame of 
reference r and an event e in a P-series so that Ẽ is b-simultaneous with 
e in r. Thus we can place Ẽ in a P-series by saying that Ẽ b-occurs in r 
at the P-series location of the P-series event e. Note that the existence of 
P-series allows for the non-transitivity of simultaneity. For consider three 
events e1, e2, and e3 such that e1 and e2 are b-simultaneous and occur 
before e3 in the frame of reference r, while e2 and e3 are b-simultaneous 
and occur before e1 in the frame of reference r*. The P-point at which e2 
occurs in r is P-prior to the P-point at which e2 occurs in r*. Therefore, 
if in r it is nowr the P-point at which e1 occurs, that e2 is nowr actual 
in r does not entail that e2 is nowr* actual in r*. And it is exactly this 
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result that makes it possible to block the well-known argument stating 
that (17) rules out any ontological difference between past, present, and 
future events:
If we take eternity as one more frame of reference, then, we thus can 
say that a temporal event’s being present and actual in eternity does not 
entail that it is present and actual at any particular time in any temporal 
reference frame (though it does follow that this event is, was, or will be 
actual in all temporal reference frames). (leftow 1991b: 234)
III. INDeTermINISm CoNTrA DIVINe TImeleSSNeSS
In this section, I shall show that in conceiving of eternity as an additional 
dimension or frame of reference, leftow’s account is – despite his claim 
– incompatible with libertarianism. I  begin with reformulating the 
underlying problem.
6
t
S(t)
t0
S(t0)
Figure 1: modeling determinism 
3.1 Divine time and free will vs. physical time and indeterminism
Setting the stage, I  argue that instead of directly focusing on the link 
between divine time and free will, we should split up the problem into 
two parts, and should first discuss if libertarian free will rules out some 
theories of physical time. Having completed this task, we are left with 
the  – I  claim – simpler problem, namely to connect some sort(s) of 
physical time (compatible with libertarian free will) and divine time. let 
us begin with a series of definitions:
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(18) An agent has free will iff it can at least sometimes be the case 
that (a) the agent is able to do otherwise under the same 
circumstances (Principle of Alternate Possibilities), and (b) the 
agent acts, or decides to act, for understandable reasons, and (c) 
the origin of the decision is within the agent.
Clearly, free will is given only if all three conditions are met, and vice 
versa, i.e. if one of these three conditions is not fulfilled, the agent does not 
decide or act freely. Note that, accordingly, (16a) the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities is a necessary but not sufficient condition for free will.
(19) Determinism (D) is the thesis that the state of the world s0 at 
some time t0 and the laws of nature together uniquely fix the 
state of the world st at any time t.
(20) Indeterminism is the denial of determinism (~D).
Although the above definition of determinism is the most common one, 
it proves useful to work out its implications, particularly the difference 
between determinism and indeterminism, in a somewhat greater detail 
than usual. Thus let us take a  closer look at the determinism thesis, 
depicted in Figure 1.
First of all, (D) implies that there is a set S of law-like4 functions S each 
of which describes a possible course of the world, while the value of S at 
a particular time t represents a possible state of the world at this particular 
time t. In Figure 1 each curve illustrates such a possible course of the 
world, while each point of such a  curve represents a  possible state of 
the world at a particular time t. Note that according to determinism the 
course of the world is uniquely fixed and therefore these curves cannot 
intersect. In principle, each law-like function S ∈ S could represent the 
actual course of the world. It is the state of the world s0 at a particular 
time t0 that first determines which law-like function represents the actual 
state of the world; it is the law-like function the graph of which entails 
the point (t0, s0).
Formalizing this proves quite useful. Thus let T be ‘time’, i.e. any 
particular point in time is an element of T, and let Z be the set of all 
possible world states. Then, a law-like function S ∈ S describing a possible 
course of the world does nothing but assign each point in time to exactly 
one particular world state. In accordance, S always takes the form
4 In calling a function S ∈ S law-like I point to the fact that the natural laws determine 
(or at least constrain) the exact form of S.
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S: T → Z, t → S(t)df = st,  (*)
where st is only an abbreviation for S(t) which we introduce for the sake 
of simplicity. remarkably, it has often been overlooked that (*) implies 
the time dependence of world states st, or to put it in other words, (D) 
entails the fact that the course of the world S is a function of a variable 
we call time t.
For each pair (t0, s0), henceforth we call ‘present’, there is (at most)5 one 
law-like function S ∈ S the graph of which entails the point (t0, s0), i.e.
∀ t0, s0 (∃1 S: S(t0) = s0) .  (uniqueness of the present)
That is to say, the present state of the world s0 uniquely determines the 
actual course of the world. Furthermore, (D) implies that the graphs 
of law-like functions S ∈ S do not intersect, that means, both the past 
course of the world and the future course of the world is unambiguously 
fixed by the laws and the present (t0, s0). Thus, if two law-like functions 
S1, S2 describe the same present, they describe the same past and the 
same future and are therefore identical, i.e.
∀ S1, S2 ∈ S (∃ t0: S1(t0) = S2(t0) ⇒ S1 = S2).  (D)
Thereby, the unalterability of the past course of the world corresponds to 
the restriction of (D) to all past times t < t0 :
∀ S1, S2 ∈ S (∃ t0: S1(t0) = S2(t0) ⇒ S1 | ( -∞ , t0) = S2 | ( -∞ , t0) ), (Dpast)
while the fact that the future course of the world is fixed corresponds to 
the restriction of (D) to all future times t > t0 :
∀ S1, S2 ∈ S (∃ t0: S1(t0) = S2(t0) ⇒ S1 | ( t0, +∞ ) = S2 | (t0, +∞)), 
   (Dfuture)
Clearly, (D) is the conjunction of (Dpast) and (Dfuture), or to put it another 
way, if the present state of the world corresponds to the law-like function 
S ∈ S, the same S represented the past course of the world and the same 
S will represent the future course of the world.
Contrarily, indeterminism (~D) states that it is not the case that (D). 
Assuming the unalterability of the past (Dpast),6 (D) states that the laws 
and the present state of the world s0 do not fix the future course of the 
5 Impossible world states correspond to pairs that are not entailed by any law-like 
function S ∈ S.
6 Note that the unalterability (or fixity) of the past need not rule out the possibility of 
the ‘could-have-been-otherness’ of the past. Contrarily, (Dpast) states nothing but the fact 
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world uniquely. Therefore (~D) is simply (~Dfuture).7 In particular, we can 
find law-like functions S1, S2 ∈ S that share the (same) past (with regard 
to a present time t0), but describe different possible futures, i.e.
∃ t0 ∈ T, S1, S2 ∈ S (S1 | ( -∞ , t0) = S2 | ( -∞ , t0) ∧ S1 | ( t0, +∞ ) ≠ S2 | (t0, +∞)).    (~D)
t
S(t)
t0
S(t0)
Figure 2: modelling indeterminism
The idea of indeterminism is depicted in Figure 2: here the present and 
the laws together do not unambiguously fix the future course of events. 
Instead, the present entails a bunch of possibilities concerning the future 
course of events, out of which, of course, only one can be actualized.
The difference between deterministic and indeterministic worlds 
becomes obvious when comparing Figure 1 and 2. While sharing the 
same past, the (open) future in an indeterministic world can significantly 
differ from the (fixed) future in a deterministic world.
(21) libertarianism8 is the thesis that free will, or more accurately 
(18a), can only be realized if (~D).
Finally, we are left with the question whether indeterminism rules 
out any time theories. To answer this question, we first must clarify 
how to use the notion of time. However, instead of giving a definition 
that once occurred the past is fixed, i.e. there is exactly one law-like function describing 
the past. Therefore, (Dpast) also applies to the past in an indeterministic world.
7 In the case that the eternalist has some doubts whether the asymmetry between our 
description of past and future world states excludes eternalism by definition, she can, 
of course, define indeterminism without restricting the unfixity of world states to the 
future. All proofs in Section 3.1 and 3.2 apply mutatis mutandis.
8 For a similar definition see Van Inwagen (2002) and Van Inwagen (2008).
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of what time simpliciter is, I suggest that, without loss of essential details, 
we only consider what it means to be a temporal event (or entity). This 
restriction has the convenient feature of not affecting the validity of the 
very argument, while at the same time evading the problem of whether it 
makes any sense to speak of the existence of time simpliciter.
In an illuminating recent essay, Dean Zimmerman formulated two 
questions ‘lying at the heart of the deepest metaphysical disagreement 
about the nature of time’ (Zimmerman 2008), these are, if there are 
objective differences between what is past, present, and future, and if 
this difference is an ontological one. Following mcTaggart’s terminology, 
those who deny both questions affirm the priority of b-relations 
(being earlier, being later, and being simultaneous), while considering 
A-properties (being past, being present, and being future) to be derivative. 
In affirming both questions, A-theorists, on the other hand, believe that 
A-properties are fundamental and b-relations derivative. Transferring 
these two questions into our context, we face the problem of (i) whether 
there is a difference between past, present, and future events, and (ii) if 
this difference is an ontological one. I claim that if libertarianism (21) is 
true, both questions need to be affirmed.
To see this, let us first formulate the relation between a present (or 
past) event et at the present (or past) time t and the state of the world st 
at t. Clearly, the state of the world st corresponds to a family (or set) of 
events e(1) ... e(n) constituting st, i.e. st = {e(1) ... e(n)}. on the other hand, 
the uniqueness of the present and the unalterability of the past (Dpast) 
imply that for a present (or past) time t there is at least one present (or 
past) event et which corresponds to exactly one present (or past) state of 
the world st, i.e.
∀t ∈ (-∞ , t0] (∃ et : ∃1 S ∈ S (et ∈ st = S(t))) (**)
as otherwise we could find two different law-like functions S1, S2 ∈ S both 
describing the same present (or past) state of the world st. Accordingly, 
the graphs of these functions would intersect in t. This, however, 
would be a  contradiction to both the uniqueness of the present and 
the unalterability of the past that exclude such an intersection. This, in 
turn, means that such a single present (or past) event et is sufficient to 
fix st, insofar as there is exactly one present (or past) state of the world st 
corresponding to et.9
Now, recall that according to (21), (~D) is a necessary condition for 
someone to satisfy (18a), and suppose that (~i). Then we can arbitrarily 
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choose an event et (happening at time t) to be a present event. However, 
from (**) we know that there is at least one et such that the state of the 
world st is uniquely defined via et. Since t is arbitrarily chosen, this 
conclusion is valid for each t, implying (Dpast) and (Dfuture). Thus (D), and 
therefore (~21).9
let us assume that (i) but (~ii). That means, although A-properties 
are fundamental, there is nevertheless no ontological difference between 
a past event, a present event, and a future event. Yet, if all future events 
exist in the same way as present events, there is a unique corresponding 
future state of the world, and this for any future times. Again, the 
conclusion implies (D), and thus (~21).
To sum up, if one affirms (21), one must at the same time affirm both 
(i) and (ii). because of (18a), libertarianism rules out all b-theories of 
time and all A-theories of time denying (ii). Consequently, the only time 
theories compatible with (21) are presentism, stating that only present 
events exist, and growing block theory, stating that only past and present 
events exist. For the sake of simplicity, in what follows I consider only 
presentism. Note, however, that the argument applies to growing block 
theory as well.
3.2 Existence: eternal vs. temporal
Having clarified the main concepts involved, in what follows, I  shall 
argue that the Anselmian view of eternity as defended by leftow fails. 
Whereas most critics question leftow’s presumptions, I  develop my 
counterargument while accepting the presumptions and criticizing the 
conclusion.
First, suppose that libertarianism is true, and thus, (~D) is true, and 
consider an arbitrary temporal frame of reference r, as defined in (12). 
In a first step, I show that
(22) for (at least) one future event et in r there can be no temporal 
frame of reference r* in which this event b-occurs.
9 more exactly, the relation between et and st can be modelled this way: For a present 
(or past) event et described through (**) we can define the (selection) function et : S → 
{0, 1}, where et (S) = 1 iff et ∈ st, that means, et ‘selects’ the law-like function S ∈ S the 
value of which at t represents the actual state of the world st entailing et. From (**) it 
follows that there is exactly one such law-like function S, i.e. |{et(S) = 1}| = 1. To ensure 
coherence with the past, at the same time we have to demand that ∀S ∈ S (et’ (S) = et (S) 
if t’ < t).
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If for all future events e in r there is a frame of reference r* such that e 
b-occurs in r*, then from (**) it follows that for any future time t in r the 
state of the world st is uniquely fixed, and thus (~21), as shown in section 
3.1. Now, consider such a future event e in r. being a temporal event in 
a temporal frame of reference r, e can only be defined in dependence 
of a time variable t, i.e. e = et; more exactly, as a temporal event, e = et 
is the value of a time-function at t, i.e. et = df e(t). on the other hand, 
et is supposed to correspond to an event ε which A-occurs in the 
eternal frame of reference (defined in 11) ret. Accordingly, ε can only be 
defined in dependence of this additional eternal dimension (henceforth 
denoted by e), that means, an eternal event is the value of a function at 
e, i.e. ε = εe = dfε(e).10 However, this leads us to two different concepts 
of existence, existence in time and existence in eternity. As pointed out 
above in section 2, leftow does not worry about these different concepts 
of existence, because he believes that it is a single event existing in two 
different modes, in time and in eternity. I will argue that this is, in fact, 
not the case.
To begin with, let us work out the concept of these two different 
concepts of existence more exactly. According to leftow’s definition, 
here quoted in (11), an event ε exists in an eternal frame of reference ret 
iff ε A-occurs in ret, i.e.
(23) ε et-exists iff ∃ ret (εe ∧ e = nowret ). (et-existence)
From (12) it follows that an event e exists in a temporal frame of reference 
r iff e b-occurs in r, i.e.
(24) e temp-exists iff ∃ r (et ∧ t = nowr ). (temp-existence)
Prima facie, it is not evident that an eternal event and a  temporal 
event do represent the same event, so that we are justified in speaking of 
two different modes of existence with regard to a single event. more than 
that, I will now argue that it is impossible for God to know if an eternal 
event represents a temporal event.
let us first identify the necessary conditions for an eternal event ε to 
represent a temporal event e. To this end, let E be the set of all eternal 
events, i.e. E = {ε : ε et-exists}, and T the set of all temporal events, i.e. 
T = {e: e temp-exists}. Clearly, an eternal event need not have a temporal 
10 Henceforth, Greek letters denote events (entities, or properties) in eternity, while 
latin letters denote events (entities, or properties) in time.
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counterpart; if an eternal event does not have a temporal counterpart, it 
is a purely eternal event. That is to say,
(25) there is a  subset E’ ⊂ E of eternal events the elements of 
which represent a temporal event, i.e. e’ = {ε : ε ∈ E and ε has 
a temporal counterpart}.
on the other hand, a  necessary (yet not sufficient) condition for an 
eternal event to represent a temporal event is that if an eternal event has 
a  temporal counterpart, then it has exactly one. For if a  single eternal 
event corresponds to different temporal events, God would falsely 
believe that two different temporal events are the same.11 This means,
(26) each ε ∈ E’ represents exactly one temporal event e ∈ T, and 
therefore there is an injective map from E’ to T.
Arguably,
(27) each temporal event e ∈ T is represented by an eternal event 
ε ∈ E.
For a temporal event without an atemporal counterpart would be a tem-
poral event that God does not know. Given an omniscient God, such 
a temporal event can, of course, not exist. moreover,
(28) each temporal event e ∈ T is represented by exactly one 
eternal event ε ∈ E’, and therefore there is a  surjective map 
from E’ to T.
For if a temporal event had more than one atemporal counterpart, God 
would falsely believe that there are different temporal events. From (26) 
and (28) it follows that
(29) there is a  bijective map (or one-to-one correspondence) b: 
E’ → T, ε → b(ε).
However, (24) implies that
(30) by definition, for each b(ε) we can find a  temporal reference 
frame r* such that b(ε) = enowr*.
Now, let e’ be a future event in a temporal reference frame r. From (29) 
we know that there is exactly one eternal event ε’ such that e’ = b(ε’). 
11 Note that this condition is a very weak one: it does not imply numerical identity as 
identity condition, but must hold for any definition of identity.
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Yet, (30) states that we can find another temporal reference frame r* 
such that e’ b-occurs in r*, i.e. e’ = b(ε’) = enowr* . obviously, this is 
a  contradiction to (22). Therefore, there cannot be a  correspondence 
between temporal events and atemporal events (as defined in 29)12 
so that it is impossible for God to know if an eternal event represents 
a temporal event. Simply put, leftow’s argument fails, insofar as events 
described by (22) are not cognitively accessible for God. This sits ill with 
God’s cognitive perfection.
IV. CoNCluDING remArKS
In this paper, I argued that libertarian free will and divine timelessness 
are incompatible when modelling eternity (understood as God’s date of 
existence) as an additional, atemporal reference frame. my main argument 
boils down to the claim that God cannot have cognitive access to 
(ontologically) indeterminate temporal events if he at the same time wants 
to preserve the possibility of alternate choice concerning these events.
In drawing my conclusions, it seems essential to point out which 
questions my argument still leaves open: Clearly, it cannot be inferred 
from my argument that divine timelessness simpliciter is a badly defined 
concept. Nor implies my argument that asserting God’s atemporality 
automatically rules out libertarian free will. Contrarily, I simply have shown 
that we cannot have it both ways when modelling eternity as an additional, 
atemporal reference frame. Therefore if libertarianism is true and God is 
not in time, we are in need of a new model reconciling both facts.
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